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Abstract—Assisted navigation software apps have a relevant
impact on our daily life. Such apps infer the current state of
roads mainly relying on the information provided by the devices
they are running over. However, technological progress in two
independent fields, i.e., mobile phone virtualization and Software
Defined Radios, has enabled brand new types of attacks. It is
nowadays possible to create fake queues of vehicles wherever in
the world, as well as to make a congested street look like the
best path to speed your travel. We refer to the aforementioned
attacks as road traffic poisoning. These attacks open up several
dreadful scenarios, where users can be maliciously re-routed by
creating congestion in target positions, or to have users choose
a given path since it is allegedly free from traffic, in both cases
possibly affecting people’s safety.
In this paper, we analyze several scenarios, and discuss
different adversary models, tools, and related attacks. We also
propose a few novel countermeasures that could be adopted to
mitigate the above threats, their limitations, and the open issues
ahead.
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 1st, 2020, Simon Weckert transported 99
second-hand smartphones in a handcart to generate virtual
traffic jams in Google Maps [1]. This experiment was pretty
successful since he was able to change the traffic state reported
by the app from total green (no traffic) to red (congested),
despite there were no cars in the surroundings. From the
navigation apps perspective, users can be either passive actors,
by simply sharing their positions with the platform and let
it infer on the current state of the traffic, or active actors,
actively providing information about the current state of the
road traffic. Indeed, the vast majority of assisted navigation
applications, such as Waze, Google Maps, and Apple Maps, to
cite a few, allow users to actively report information, signaling
events like constructions and traffic incidents. On the one hand,
this feature contributes with useful real-time information to re-
route and to provide a more accurate Estimated Time of Arrival
(ETA). On the other hand, if maliciously exploited, these
reporting functionalities can severely affect the road traffic
state, for instance by causing traffic jamming or isolating
targeted areas.
Google Maps is currently used by more than one billion
monthly active users, representing not only a tool for turn-by-
turn navigation, but also an effective way to reduce the ETA.
Therefore, injecting massive amounts of fake information (or
a few targeted ones) can affect people’s daily activities and,
if done for malicious purposes, even their safety. We refer to
the previous behavior as road traffic poisoning.
The major issue related to the above-introduced vulnerabili-
ties of assisted-navigation apps is represented by the untrusted
source of the information those apps rely on [2]. Indeed, road
traffic poisoning can be achieved not only by maliciously
setting up a large number of devices, but also, and more
effectively, by potentially scaling up the attack from a remote
and undetected location. For instance, this could be possible
by either compromising the positions of a large number of
users (i.e., spoofing the Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) signal), or generating a collection of virtual devices
with colluding positions and movements.
GNSS spoofing is an effective and efficient technique to let
a target device estimate a fake position. It can be performed
with cheap Software Defined Radio (SDR) and it can affect
a significant number of devices in the neighborhood of the
GNSS spoofer, depending on its transmitting capabilities [3].
This attack becomes particularly effective when the adversary
exploits the presence of many real devices in a crowded place.
Indeed, by spoofing their positions, it can affect the traffic
status of any place in the world.
The above scenario can be further magnified when considering
the increasing number of smart devices that are becoming
interconnected. Indeed, the number of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices is estimated to reach 75.44 billion by 2025 and, being
the largest platform of interconnected devices, there have been
already cases where a subset is compromised and used to
launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. It is
just a matter of time when a large number of devices will
be exploited and used for road traffic poisoning. Given the
number of involved devices, it might be possible to create
fake traffic congestion in different areas of several cities, and
therefore, countrywide.
However, the most dreadful attack scenario, which is both
convenient and scalable from an adversarial point of view,
is the one where virtual devices come into play. Smart-
phone virtualization can be easily achieved by tools such
as Android Studio, enabling the generation of hundreds, if
not thousands, of virtual smartphones reporting fake Global
Positioning System (GPS) positions. It is worth mentioning
that this attack does not involve any physical device, hence
being also relatively cheap, can be launched from any place
in the world, and leaves little hope for attribution.
Contribution. The contributions of this paper are man-
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2ifold: firstly, we provide a structured analysis of a new
cyber-physical attack, i.e., road traffic poisoning, discussing
the associated threat models, the expected impact, and the
threat agents (i.e., adversaries) that might have an interest
in implementing such an attack. Moreover, we report on the
available tools to deliver the attack, their features, and their
effectiveness. Finally, we propose several countermeasures,
taking into account different scenarios and requirements.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows.
Section II summarizes the most relevant studies in the lit-
erature related to GNSS spoofing. Section III introduces the
threat models and highlights the impact of our study. The ad-
versary models are introduced in Section IV, while Section V
describes the enabling tools required to launch Road Traffic
Poisoning attacks. Section VI introduces some original and
effective countermeasures, while in Section VII we draw some
concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Several studies available in the literature already highlighted
some vulnerabilities associated with automatic navigation sys-
tems. For instance, the authors in [4] demonstrated that an
automatic navigation system can be cheated by a co-located
smart attacker intelligently spoofing the GNSS signal. Specifi-
cally, the attack can be carried out in a way to detour the user
via a path that has similar crosses and turns of the underlying
real path, being different only in just a few of them. Similarly,
some contributions already identified the security issues related
to fake reporting in mobile crowdsourced systems, and pointed
out some high-level countermeasures [5].
As per GNSS spoofing, this issue has generated a very
active research thread, focused on a few scenarios, including
smart grids [6], turn-by-turn navigation [2], and cyber-physical
systems [7].
Detecting the presence of a GNSS spoofer is a challenging
task that, during the years, has been carried out mainly by
relying on alternative pieces of information. Authors in [3]
suggested exploiting cellular networks beaconing information
to implement device localization with an error that is accept-
able for many real-life scenarios. The cited solution does not
require any intervention on the network infrastructure, while
introducing only a minimal overhead to the user device.
The authors in [8] proposed an independent infrastructure to
collect (spoofed) positions from airborne traffic and to infer
the presence of a GPS spoofer. Their solution monitors the
air traffic from GPS-derived positions advertisements that air-
borne traffic periodically broadcasts for safety purposes. While
not requiring any intervention at both the GNSS infrastructure
and the device side, the aforementioned solution involves the
deployment of a significant number of nodes to collect the
GPS-derived positions.
A GNSS receiver clock offset attack is proposed in [9]. The
authors showed how to exploit GNSS spoofing to introduce a
clock offset in the Phasor Measurement Unitss (PMUs). Such
an attack introduces an error in the receiver clock offset and,
therefore, in the phase error between the voltage and current
phase measurements provided by the PMU.
Device cooperation is proposed in [10] to detect and
mitigate GPS spoofing attacks. Each device in the network
correlates its position with the one received by other peers
belonging to the same network—hence inferring on posi-
tioning mismatches. Authors proved that cooperative position
authentication can be effectively adopted to detect and mitigate
GPS spoofing attacks.
The Doppler effect is used to verify the integrity of the GPS
signal in [11]. Authors proved that their solution can reliably
predict the Doppler shift of GPS signal with an accuracy of
about 1Hz, highlighting how the Doppler effect can be adopted
for GPS spoofing detection.
Authors in [12] proposed a spatial processing technique
involving an antenna array to measure the phase delay of an
actual GPS signal and so inferring on its authenticity. The core
idea is rooted in the fact that spoofed signals arrive at the
receiver from the same direction, being the spoofer a single
transmitting source. Conversely, genuine GPS signals arrive
from different locations given the nature of the GPS satellite
constellation.
A summary and comparison of the contributions discussed
above are reported in Table I. It is worth noting that, in prin-
ciple, all the above strategies can be integrated on commercial
mobile and IoT devices to detect an ongoing GNSS spoofing
attack. Results may be reported to a navigation software to
invalidate the attack. However, most of them would require
either totally new hardware or dedicated, ad-hoc infrastructure.
The high cost of the highlighted requirements makes it difficult
for the cited solutions to be massively deployed. Moreover,
lightweight and inexpensive solutions, such as [3] and [8],
always assume the target device to be collaborative with the
detection system. If the device is intentionally carrying out the
attack, or it has been compromised, these applications can be
easily stopped, inhibited, or cheated, thus resulting ineffective.
III. THREAT MODELS AND IMPACT
In this section, we depict the objectives motivating the
adversary to launch traffic poisoning attacks, as well as the
impact of such attacks. Overall, the following threat models
can be identified:
• Fake Traffic Generation. The adversary aims to make a
target road appearing as congested, while in reality there
is regular traffic on that road. This attack can be used
to reroute the traffic to alternative roads. To this aim,
the adversary can place a significant number of mobile
devices to the target road, each one contributing, with its
mere presence, to the (fake) congestion. The navigation
software will conclude that such a road is congested
and will suggest the users avoid it, proposing alternative
routes.
• Fake Road De-congestion. The adversary aims to make
a target road appearing as free, while in reality, it is
congested. This attack will eventually drive the victims to
congested roads, significantly delaying or blocking their
travel, and worsening the congestion. To achieve this goal,
the attacker can rely on a significant number of devices,
each one reporting regular travel speed on the target road,
3Table I: Overview of related work on GNSS spoofing detection and derived system requirements
Ref. No Auxiliary Ad-HocInfrastructure
No Hardware
Update/Swap
Effective when the
Device is Compromised
[3] 3 3 7
[8] 7 7 7
[9] 3 7 7
[10] 7 3 7
[11] 3 7 7
[12] 3 7 7
to overhang the number of vehicles originally reporting
congestion phenomena on the same road. Moreover, if
placed in the same geographical location of the devices,
the attacker could spoof the GNSS position of the device
correctly contributing to have the road being labeled as
congested. When the GNSS position is spoofed, they
would stop reporting the information related to the road
they are really on, making the attack easier. This will lead
the navigation software to (wrongly) consider the road as
not-congested, thus justifying its possible inclusion in the
optimal path towards other destinations.
Potential attackers may be motivated by different reasons,
some of which are reported below.
• Financial gain. Let us assume there are two competing
shops in a town, both selling similar items. One of the
owners may place fake vehicles on the streets adjacent
to the competitor’s shop, to simulate road congestion,
as well as create fake reports, to make people believe
the streets have been temporarily closed. This would
discourage possible clients to reach the second shop, thus
threatening its potential earnings. The attack can easily
scale to increasingly sized targets, such as neighborhoods,
city blocks, and cities themselves.
• Terrorism. This threat may have tragic consequences
when it comes to terrorist purposes. Indeed, a terrorist
would be able to carry out two types of attacks: mass
attacks, and targeted attacks, respectively. In a mass
attack, the terrorist could spoof the cellphones’ GPS in
a busy road, instantaneously “teleporting” the drivers,
together with the passengers, anywhere in the world.
By consulting the navigation app, users would observe
a road with low (or no) traffic and considerate to take it,
inevitably ending up in the queue. In this way the terrorist
would have channeled a large number of vehicles onto a
small, eventually congested street, possibly blocking a
target in the queue, making it easier to strike. In a target
attack, the terrorist could create fake traffic to congest
several streets of a city, thus forcing a specific target
to follow a particular path, known in advance by the
terrorist, where he could strike the target.
IV. ADVERSARY MODELS
Different tools and strategies can be used by the adversary
to achieve the goals above described, each characterized by
peculiar pros and cons. Some examples are provided below,
while a summary of our discussion is synthesized in Table II.
• A1: Real Physically-Located Mobile Devices. An easy
strategy that can be implemented by the adversary relies
Figure 1: An attacker, equipped with an SDR, spoofs the GPS
of the mobile devices in a crowded places, geographically
teleporting them from their true location (i.e., Rome) to a
Manhattan targeted street, thus making the target be labeled
as congested.
Figure 2: An attacker uses virtual and emulated devices to
create fake vehicles to be remotely placed on a target street,
thus creating fake road traffic.
on a significant number of real mobile devices, physically
located in the target geographical places. Each device
is opportunely set up by the adversary to achieve the
desired goal. For instance, if the adversary aims at
reporting a congested road, the mobile devices will be
placed where needed to emulate road congestion. Despite
being very simple in practice, such a model requires the
adversary to control a significant number of real mobile
devices and, possibly, many collaborators. Note that the
feasibility of such an adversary model has been recently
demonstrated in Berlin, as reported by several media and
newspapers [1].
4Table II: Overview of Adversary Models and Related Aspects.
Adv.
Model
Physical vs
Remote Required Tools
Required
Skills Cost
A1 Physical Several mobile devices Low Cost of mobile devices, High.
A2 Remote Several mobile devices, laptop, SDR, GPSspoofing toolkit on laptop Moderate
Cost of mobile devices, SDR, and
Laptop, Very High.
A3 Remote laptop, SDR, GPS spoofing toolkit onlaptop Moderate
Cost of SDR and Laptop,
Moderate
A4 Remote Emulation Tools, Powerful Workstation High Powerful Workstation, Moderate.
A5 Remote Zombies Very High Moderate to High.
A6 Physical/Remote Several mobile devices Low Cost of mobile devices, High.
• A2: Real Ad-Hoc Mass Spoofed Mobile Devices.
Another strategy consists of spoofing the GNSS position
of several dedicated mobile devices that are physically
co-located and under the direct control of the adversary.
GNSS technologies are well-known to be insecure and
exposed to easy-to-perform and low-cost GNSS spoofing
attacks [13]. Indeed, these attacks can be easily performed
by using a cheap SDR and a laptop, equipped with a
GNSS Spoofing Application, such as GPS-SDR-SIM [14].
Thus, the attacker needs to collect many mobile devices
and to spoof their geographical location, according to the
specific target of the attack. This type of attack can be
performed remotely to the target area, thus removing the
need for malicious devices to be physically distributed
over the target location. However, the attacker should be
skilled enough to use GNSS spoofing tools.
• A3: Real Unaware Mass Spoofed Mobile Devices.
Similarly to the previous adversary model, the attacker
can spoof the location of mobile devices belonging to
unaware, legitimate users, geographically located in the
place of interest. To provide a reference example, the
attacker can spoof the locations of all the users partic-
ipating in a big event (e.g., sports events, or concerts)
or in a crowded place (e.g., airport, conference hotel).
In this way, all the users in the surrounding area will be
geographically projected to a target area. Further devel-
opments of the attack would make all the users appear
moving according to a predefined path, orchestrated by
the attacker. An instance of this attack is depicted in
Figure 1.
• A4: Emulated Mobile Devices. Another strategy that
allows to remotely perform the attack requires the uti-
lization of emulated mobile devices. By relying on a
computational unit with sufficient memory and computa-
tional resources (e.g., a laptop or a workstation)—or a set
of orchestrated, less powerful units—the adversary can
install a mobile device emulation tool, such as BlueStacks
or Android Studio Emulator. Such tools allow launching
emulated devices where the attacker can install widely
available GPS spoofing applications (e.g., FakeGPS Free)
to pollute a real GNSS position. These applications
allow the adversary to geographically (virtually) place
the spoofed devices onto a target location. This kind of
attack can be performed remotely and using just virtual
resources, since neither physical devices nor wireless
signals are required. However, the attacker should be
skilled enough to master both emulation tools and spoof-
ing applications. This attack is illustrated in Figure 2.
• A5: Compromised Sparse Devices. Skilled and mo-
tivated adversaries can compromise many real devices
(e.g., via trojans or worms), transforming these devices
into zombies of a botnet. In this context, the adversary
can rely on malicious agents that stealthily install GNSS
spoofing applications (e.g., the FakeGPS Free applica-
tion previously-mentioned) on the cited devices. When
triggered by a remote Command & Control center, all
these devices can be virtually placed to a given target
geographical location, thus starting the remote attack. It
is worth noting that this strategy extends the number
of devices the attacker can rely upon, as even IoT
devices can be used to launch the attack. While being
totally remote and potentially stealthy, the attack requires
significant skills from the adversary, as well as time to
set up the infecting tools to compose the botnet.
• A6: Fake Reporting. Finally, an easy strategy to poison
road traffic navigation systems is to report fake data, not
corresponding to real situations. This can be achieved by
using a massive amount of real mobile devices, reporting
all the same conditions, such as the temporary closure
of a road, a traffic queue, or an accident. Note that this
attack can be either physical, having the devices located
at the target roads, or remote, using emulated devices
and ad-hoc GNSS spoofing apps. The feasibility of these
attacks has been reported in [2].
V. ENABLING TOOLS
In this section, we describe the rationale and the setup of
the operation tools used in this study to launch road traffic
poisoning attacks. We focus on two main scenarios: the in-loco
fake traffic attack (S1), and the virtual remote traffic attack
(S2), respectively.
S1: In-Loco Fake Traffic Attack. Consistently with the
Adversary Model A2, in this scenario, the attacker has to be
in the same geographical location as the victims. The attack
requires the following enabling tools.
• Spoofing Hardware Device. The hardware required to
spoof a GNSS signal mainly consists of an SDR, such
as HackRF, LimeSDR, and Ettus Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP), to cite a few. SDRs allow
implementing via software a set of radio components that
are traditionally implemented via hardware.
• Software Development Toolkit. One of the most com-
monly adopted platform to deploy proof-of-concept radio
5Table III: Overview of the proposed countermeasures, pros, and cons.
Countermeasure ImplementationSide Pros Cons
C1 Client Ease of distribution (software update) Ineffective when the device is willingto attack
C2 Cloud Ease of distribution and application(software update) Only increase the difficulty of attack
C3 Cloud Detection of mass instantaneousmoving
Privacy threatening,
Computationally-intensive, and
time-consuming
C4 Cloud No fake emulated devices Limiting User Devices
C5 Cloud Lightweight and Easy to apply(software update) Risks of Collusion
C6 Cloud Effective High Costs, Privacy Risks
applications is GNURadio, defined as an open-source
software development toolkit featuring a significant num-
ber of already implemented processing blocks.
• Spoofing Module. One of the most adopted software
tools to spoof a GNSS signal is GPS-SDR-SIM, which
is an open-source software-defined GPS signal simulator
featuring several spoofing options such as static locations,
time synchronization, and paths with different speeds.
S2: Virtual Remote Traffic Attack. Consistently with the
Adversary Model A4, in this scenario, the attacker has the
opportunity to perform a remote attack to change the road
traffic conditions anywhere in the world. The attack requires
the following enabling tools.
• Mobile Terminal Emulator. The attacker relies on tools
enabling Android applications to run on PCs, regardless
of the host operating systems. Tools of this type include
Android Studio Emulator, BlueStacks, and Genymotion
Android Emulator, to name a few.
• GPS Faker. Once emulated the Android devices, the
attacker should exploit apps, web services, and other
means to spoof their GNSS locations. The reference
Android market, i.e., Google Play Store, boasts many
working applications, such as “Fake GPS GO Location
Spoofer Free”, that allows being instantly geographically
teleported anywhere in the world, as well as to set
specific routes the fake (i.e., emulated) person will run
across. Such a service is installed by default on some
emulators. For instance, the BlueStacks emulator includes
an application, namely “Location Provider”, that allows
to statically set a geographical location to be teleported
to, and such application can be easily installed in other
emulators.
• Support PC. To run the emulated devices, the adversary
needs a PC to support virtualization. The performance of
the PC (i.e., the amount of memory and computational
capabilities) will dictate the number of devices that
can be emulated. It is worth noting that the adversary
may rely on powerful servers, as well as on virtual
machines/containers from the cloud (i.e., Amazon Web
Services, Microsoft Azure, Docker, to name a few) to
carry out the attack, having the opportunity to disseminate
a huge number of fake devices and provoke heavy and
potentially dangerous services outage.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we describe some countermeasures to the
threats and attacks above described. A summary of the fol-
lowing discussion is synthesized in Table III.
Overall, the strategies to mitigate the above attacks could
be distinguished in client-side countermeasures and cloud-side
countermeasures.
On the client-side, any countermeasure to avoid GNSS
spoofing implies the presence of benign devices, that are
not fully controlled by the adversary and do not participate
voluntarily in the attacks. This is the case for the Adver-
sary Model A3. In this scenario, an effective countermeasure
consists of applying standard GNSS spoofing detection and
mitigation techniques to protect such devices from being part
of the attack (C1). For instance, as described by the authors
in [3], crowdsourced information originated from the mobile
cellular network, or any other communication technology such
as ADS-B, can be used to detect the GNSS spoofing attack [8].
However, if the attacker owns the attacking devices, or it
has physically compromised the devices by taking full control,
the above-described techniques could be made ineffective.
The good news is that for cases: A1, A2, A4, A5, and A6
discussed in Section IV, the attacks can be effectively detected,
though only by the service provider, i.e. cloud-side. Different
techniques, listed in the following, can be adopted in this case
to either mitigate or, at least, make the attack more difficult.
• C2: Crowdsourcing. The software application running
on the devices can gather heterogeneous information in
addition to the GNSS location only. These pieces of
information include, but are not limited to, the instanta-
neous readings of the accelerometer, the magnetometer,
the information about the base stations of the cellular
network, and the current IP address. Then, the automatic
navigation system servers on the cloud could evaluate
and verify the consistency of these pieces of information.
While this strategy does not provide a 100% guarantee
of detecting the attacks (all the above-reported readings
can be falsified and artfully tuned by the adversary, as
shown in [15]), it significantly increases the difficulty for
the attack to succeed, forcing the adversary to coordinate
several sources to be effective.
• C3: Temporal Analysis. Using the information available
on the cloud, the service provider can adopt Artificial
Intelligence (AI) techniques to analyze the behavior of
6users throughout time, as well as the evolution of the
situation for a specific road over time. For instance, the
service provider can detect an attack if a road suddenly
(or in a very short time frame) becomes congested shortly
after being used by a few users. Similarly, an immediate
and mass movement of a group of users from the same
place to a far location could be easily and quickly
detected.
• C4: Multiple-Factor Authentication on Mobile Devices
with unique value pairs. To thwart the adversary models
A4 and A5 based on emulated devices, a simple coun-
termeasure could consist in verifying that each device
reporting information in the navigation system is asso-
ciated exactly to a single physical user. A method to
achieve this objective could rely on multi-factor authenti-
cation, leveraging unique International Mobile Subscriber
Identitys (IMSIs) and International Mobile Equipment
Identitys (IMEIs), verifiable by the manufacturer. While
being quite effective in reducing the extent of the attack,
such countermeasure would require coordination between
multiple independent companies, also sharing potentially
private data. Thus, it would require significant overhead,
time, and resources by the involved companies.
• C5: Trust Mechanisms. An alternative countermeasure
could consist of building up a trust logic, where each
device injecting information in the system is characterized
by a trust score. This score could change dynamically,
based on the feedback that users provide. Therefore, only
when the device injecting information is trusted enough,
the specific information can be classified as trusted and
used for navigation purposes. Although improving the
overall difficulty and time required to attack the system,
this countermeasure can be circumvented if the attacker
owns a significant number of devices. Indeed, these
devices could start colluding and improving each other
trust. Without loss of generality, traditional anti-collusion
techniques in trust systems can be used to enhance the
robustness of the system. Note that if the devices are
spoofed by the attacker, this logic would not be effective.
• C6: Smart Cities Assistance. By definition, a Smart City
is an urban area that relies on smart devices (including,
but not limited to IoT) to collect data and to suggest
consequent actions. The insights gained from these data
will drive every decision to make, to efficiently manage
(i.e., optimize) resources, services, and assets. Privacy-
preserving measurements could be collected to under-
stand the extent of road traffic on the streets within a city.
For instance, smart traffic lights, as well as smart street
lamps and smart axle counters, may provide publicly
accessible information about the traffic without revealing
any information about the vehicles. The automatic nav-
igation system servers could cross-correlate these pieces
of information with the user reports to achieve more au-
thoritative knowledge and provide accurate and effective
route recommendations. While being quite promising,
this solution could be made ineffective if some auxiliary
IoT devices are physically tampered or hacked.
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have discussed the models, attacks, and
potential novel countermeasures related to the road poisoning
attack affecting the navigation apps currently available in the
market. Indeed, navigation apps strongly rely on user-provided
information—either actively or passively. The former being
sent with the active involvement of the user, while the latter
being collected by the app, for instance in terms of user’s
position and speed. In this paper, we have discussed how
the aforementioned information can be corrupted and used
for launching attacks that can scale up to hundreds, or even
thousands, of (fake) users. Moreover, we have provided a
classification of the possible attacks based on the involved re-
sources. Finally, we have discussed possible countermeasures
and their limitations, also highlighting related open issues.
The models, attacks, and countermeasures discussed in this
paper, other than being interesting on their own, have also the
potential to pave the way for future work in the area.
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